

# ENDNOTES

1. See, for example, C. Phenicie, “74 Interview: Senator Lamar Alexander on Keeping ESSA From Becoming The Next Obamacare,” *The 74*, July 10, 2016, <https://www.the74million.org/article/the-74-interview-lamar-alexander-on-keeping-essa-from-becoming-the-next-obamacare>.
2. Two states earns marks of not applicable. Montana received one for its annual school labels because its deciding between summative ratings that are text based, which would likely earn it a medium grade, and those that are similar to A–F, five-star, and numeric ratings, which would earn it a strong grade. And New York received one for its fairness to high poverty schools because it does not provide enough detail in its plan to determine the importance of growth in its system.
3. R. Hess, “Of ESSA Plans and TPS Reports,” *Education Week*, May 31, 2017, [blogs.edweek.org/edweek/rick\\_hess\\_straight\\_up/2017/05/of\\_essa\\_plans\\_and\\_tps\\_reports.html](https://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/rick_hess_straight_up/2017/05/of_essa_plans_and_tps_reports.html).
4. E. Hanushek and M. Raymond, *Does School Accountability Lead to Improved Student Performance?* (Washington, D.C.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004), <http://hanushek.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/hanushek+raymond.2005jpam24-2.pdf>; M. Carnoy and S. Loeb, “Does External Accountability Affect Student Outcomes? A Cross-State Analysis,” *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis* 24, no. 4 (2002), <https://cepa.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/EEPAaccountability.pdf>.
5. ESSA requires states to annually identify their lowest performing schools, which are then subject to intervention. There is no explicit mandate, however, for states to assign ratings to schools beyond those identified for intervention and those not. States that publish A–F grades and the like are choosing to do so voluntarily.
6. J. Booher-Jennings, *Below the Bubble: ‘Educational Triage’ and the Texas Accountability System* (New York, NY: Columbia University, 2005), <http://aer.sagepub.com/content/42/2/231.short>; D. Ballou and M. Springer, *Achievement Trade-Offs and No Child Left Behind* (Nashville, TN: Peabody College of Vanderbilt University, 2008), [http://www.vanderbilt.edu/schoolchoice/documents/achievement\\_tradeoffs.pdf](http://www.vanderbilt.edu/schoolchoice/documents/achievement_tradeoffs.pdf).
7. J. Plucker et al., *Talent on the Sidelines: Excellence Gaps and America’s Persistent Talent Underclass* (Storrs, CT: University of Connecticut, Center for Education Policy Analysis, 2013), <http://cepa.uconn.edu/mindthegap>.
8. C. Finn, Jr. and B. Wright, *Failing Our Brightest Kids: The Global Challenge of Educating High-Ability Students* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press, 2015).
9. Ibid.
10. See, for example, A. Churchill, “Unless They Want to Flunk Virtually all High-Poverty Schools, Policymakers Should Go for Growth” (Washington, D.C.: Thomas B. Fordham Institute, May 17, 2017), <https://edexcellence.net/articles/unless-they-want-to-flunk-virtually-all-high-poverty-schools-policymakers-should-go-for>.
11. For many reasons why proficiency rates are problematic, see M. Polikoff, et al., “A Letter to the U.S. Department of Education,” MorganPolikoff.com, updated July 14, 2016, <https://morganpolikoff.com/2016/07/12/a-letter-to-the-u-s-department-of-education>.
12. Secretary DeVos, Letter to States Regarding Consolidated State Plans (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education, February 10, 2017), <https://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/secletter/170210.html>.

13. ESSA State Plan Submission (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education, retrieved July 6, 2017), <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/statesubmission.html>.
14. D. Figlio and S. Loeb, "School Accountability," in *Handbooks in Economics: Economics of Education*, Volume 3, eds. E. Hanushek et al., (The Netherlands: North-Holland, 2011), 383–421, [https://cepa.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Accountability\\_Handbook.pdf](https://cepa.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Accountability_Handbook.pdf).
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Based on contents of state plans reviewed for this report. See ESSA State Plan Submission (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education, retrieved October 31, 2017), <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/statesubmission.html>.
19. Two states earn marks of not applicable. Montana received one for its annual school labels because its deciding between summative ratings that are text based, which would likely earn it a medium grade, and those that are similar to A–F, five-star, and numeric ratings, which would earn it a strong grade. And New York received one for its fairness to high poverty schools because it does not provide enough detail in its plan to determine the importance of growth in its system.
20. Figure 1 does not display Montana because it hasn't decided which summative ratings it will use.
21. The color of each state's bar corresponds to the grade it received for this objective. Green indicates strong, yellow indicates medium, and red indicates weak. See the section on methods for more information. Figure 2 does not display Nebraska or New York. New York received a strong grade, and Nebraska received a medium. But neither state assigns indicators specific weights, so we're unable to plot them on this figure. See their individual state profiles for more information.
22. Note that New York received a strong grade but it isn't displayed in Figure 2. It doesn't assign indicators specific weights, so we're unable to plot it on the figure.
23. Note that Nebraska received a medium grade but it isn't displayed in Figure 2. It doesn't assign indicators specific weights, so we're unable to plot it on the figure.
24. The color of each state's bar corresponds to the grade it received for this objective. Green indicates strong, yellow indicates medium, and red indicates weak. See the section on methods for more information. Figure 3 does not display Nebraska or New York. Nebraska received a medium rating, and New York received a mark of not applicable. But neither state assigns indicators specific weights, so we're unable to plot them on this figure. See their individual state profiles for more information.
25. L. Camera, "Education Shifts to the States," *U.S. News & World Report*, December 9, 2015, <https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2015/12/09/new-federal-education-law-shifts-power-to-states>.
26. See Alabama's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 26, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/alconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
27. See Alaska's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 18, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/akconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
28. See Arizona's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on May 9, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/azcsa2017.pdf>.
29. See Arkansas's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 18, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/arconsolidatedstateplans.pdf>.

30. See California's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 18, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/caconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
31. See Colorado's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on May 9, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/cocsa2017.pdf>.
32. See Connecticut's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on April 21, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/ctcsa2017.pdf>.
33. See Delaware's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on April 3, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/decsa2017.pdf>.
34. See the District of Columbia's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on May 2, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/dccsa2017.pdf>.
35. See Florida's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 20, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/flconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
36. See Georgia's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 18, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/gaconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
37. See Hawaii's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 21, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/hiconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
38. See Idaho's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 18, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/idconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
39. See Illinois's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on May 2, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/ilcsa2017.pdf>.
40. See Indiana's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 18, 2017, <https://www.doe.in.gov/sites/default/files/essa/essa-consolidated-plan.pdf>.
41. See Iowa's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 18, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/iaconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
42. Iowa uses an achievement measure that comprises both scale scores and a proficiency rate. It also uses a series of indicator weights that change over a three-year period. This total is therefore the average over that three-year period of the sum of Iowa's growth measure and one-half of its achievement indicator.
43. See Kansas's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 18, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/ksconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
44. See Kentucky's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 18, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/kyconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
45. Kentucky's weights are not yet set. Its plan says, "Standards setting will confirm the weighting of the indicators in the overall rating" and provides a table that shows "the lower and upper ranges possible for each indicator." For the purpose of this evaluation, we've used the median percentage in each range.
46. See Louisiana's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on May 3, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/lacsa2017.pdf>.
47. See Maine's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on May 4, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/mecsa2017.pdf>.

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48. See Maryland's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 18, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/mdconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
49. See Massachusetts's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on May 10, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/macsa2017.pdf>, and Massachusetts's additional information, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on May 10, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/maadditionalinfo.pdf>.
50. See Michigan's revised ESSA plan, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 6, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/micsa2017.pdf>.
51. See Minnesota's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 18, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/mnconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
52. Minnesota will use five indicators to differentiate among schools that serve elementary and middle school grades. Two of those are growth to proficiency measures—one for ELA and one for math. The state doesn't specify weights, so 40 percent is based on those two indicators making up 40 percent of the indicators used for these schools.
53. See Mississippi's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 18, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/msconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
54. See Missouri's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 18, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/moconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
55. See Montana's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 14, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/mtconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
56. Although the weight that Montana assigns to growth isn't enough to earn it medium ratings for its focus on all students or fairness to high-poverty schools, it's worth noting that the state nevertheless assigns growth more weight than any other single indicator.
57. See Nebraska's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 22, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/neconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
58. See Nevada's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on April 12, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/nvcsa2017.docx>.
59. See New Hampshire's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 24, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/nhconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
60. See New Jersey's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on May 3, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/njcsa2017.pdf>.
61. See New Mexico's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on April 11, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/nmcsa2017.pdf>; New Mexico's state plan appendices, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on April 11, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/nmappendices17.pdf>.
62. See New York's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 18, 2017, <http://www.p12.nysed.gov/accountability/essa/documents/nys-essa-technical-plan-draft-9-18-17-to-usdoe.pdf>.
63. See North Carolina's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 18, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/ncconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.

- 64.** See North Dakota’s state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on May 5, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/ndcsa2017.pdf>.
- 65.** See Ohio’s state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 18, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/ohconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
- 66.** See Oklahoma’s state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 18, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/okconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
- 67.** In Oklahoma the scale scores that count towards the second objective—the focus on all students—also work as a growth measure for economically disadvantaged students, so the measure also counts toward the third objective (fairly holding high-poverty schools accountable).
- 68.** See Oregon’s state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on May 3, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/orcsa2017.pdf>.
- 69.** See Pennsylvania’s state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 18, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/paconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
- 70.** Pennsylvania doesn’t assign exact weights to its indicators, instead opting for a two-step process of identifying elementary and middle schools for support. The first step, however, is the most important, and uses a four-quadrant plot that considers proficiency and student growth equally. A school is only identified for support if it has both low growth and a low proficiency rate. Because of these conditions, we believe that assigning growth a weight of 50 percent makes sense for this analysis, given our methodology. See pages 50–53 of Pennsylvania’s state plan request.
- 71.** Ibid.
- 72.** See Rhode Island’s state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 18, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/riconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
- 73.** See South Carolina’s State Plan Request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on October 13, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/scconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
- 74.** See South Dakota’s state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 18, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/sdconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
- 75.** See Tennessee’s state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on May 3, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/tncsa2017.pdf>.
- 76.** See Texas’s state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 25, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/txconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
- 77.** For elementary and middle schools, Texas will assign annual A–F summative grades by looking at the better of a school’s proficiency rate or student growth (not both), and “averaging that composite with the Closing the Gaps domain, which must account for at least 30 percent of the overall rating.” This means that in a school with, for example, high proficiency but low growth, student growth for all students will not be something for which it’s held accountable. And this is apt to lead such schools to disregard the needs of higher-achieving children.
- 78.** For elementary and middle schools, Texas will assign annual A–F summative grades by looking at the better of a school’s proficiency rate or student growth (not both), and “averaging that composite with the Closing the Gaps domain, which must account for at least 30 percent of the overall rating.” Proficiency rates and all other achievement measures are strongly correlated with prior achievement—and given that low-income students tend to enter school far behind their peers, high-poverty schools are likely to fare poorly under such measures, no matter how effective the school and its teachers

- are. Growth measures, however, quantify changes in achievement over time, independent of whether students start as high or low performers; hence they're less correlated with poverty. Therefore, Texas's system is very fair to schools with high rates of poverty because it allows them to ignore their proficiency rate altogether and focus on what's under their control—growth.
- 79.** See Utah's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 18, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/utconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
  - 80.** See Vermont's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on May 3, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/vtcsa2017.pdf>.
  - 81.** Forty percent is the maximum weight that can be assigned to Vermont's measure of growth for all students. Depending on circumstances, however, that weight can be as low as 35 percent for a given school.
  - 82.** See Virginia's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 21, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/vaconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
  - 83.** See Washington's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 18, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/waconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
  - 84.** See West Virginia's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 21, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/wvconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
  - 85.** See Wisconsin's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 18, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/wiconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
  - 86.** See Wyoming's state plan request, submitted to the U.S. Department of Education on September 21, 2017, <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/account/stateplan17/wyconsolidatedstateplan.pdf>.
  - 87.** M. Polikoff et al., "A Letter to the U.S. Department of Education," MorganPolikoff.com, updated July 12, 2016, <https://morganpolikoff.com/2016/07/12/a-letter-to-the-u-s-department-of-education>.
  - 88.** For more detailed information of measures of academic growth, see K. Castellano and A. Ho, *A Practitioner's Guide to Growth Models*, Council of Chief State School Officers (February 2013), <http://www.ccsso.org/Documents/2013GrowthModels.pdf>.
  - 89.** Explanations of these models come from M. Petrilli et al., *High Stakes for High Achievers: State Accountability in the Age of ESSA* (Washington, D.C.: Thomas B. Fordham Institute, August 2016, <http://edex.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/08.31%20-%20High%20Stakes%20for%20High%20Achievers%20-%20State%20Accountability%20in%20the%20Age%20of%20ESSA.pdf>).